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PARENS PATRIAE SUITS BY A STATE UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Ostensibly inspired by a concern for state autonomy, the Supreme Court has in
the past decade sharply restricted the availability of 42 U.S. C § 1983-a statute
whose verypurpose was to remedy civil rights violations "under color of' state law.
How can civil rights protection be preserved while satisfying the Court's federalism
concerns? This Note suggests that granting parens patriae standing under section
1983 will encourage civil rights enforcement by the states themselves. While such
standing may contradict the original purpose of the statute, it offers effective civil
rights enforcement without compromising state autonomy. This Note examines the
history of section 1983 and analyzes its restrictive reading by the Supreme Court. It
then explores the nature of theparenspatriae remedy and discusses its applicability
to civil rights litigation. The Note concludes that parenspatriae standing, while not a
panacea, can be a useful device for restoring theprotections of section 1983.
INTRODUCTION
IN RECENT YEARS, the Supreme Court has limited the availa-
bility of federal civil rights protection.' Under notions of "eq-
uity, comity, and federalism,"2 the Court has denied relief against
individual state and municipal defendants.' Ironically, this con-
cern for state autonomy restricts recovery under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 4 --a statute whose very purpose was to remedy civil rights
I. See, ag., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (barring availability of § 1983
actions where state tort remedy exists); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (restricting
availability of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (restricting availability of federal equal protection actions by imposing require-
ment of discriminatory intent); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (barring civil rights
actions for injury to reputation); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (restricting avail-
ability of civil rights actions by recognizing absolute immunity for certain state officials);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (restricting'availability of federal injunctions against
state officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (restricting availability of civil
rights actions by allowing qualified good faith immunity to certain state officials); United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (restricting access to federal court through imposition of
court fees upon indigents). But see Peters, Municipal Liability After Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence and Maine v. Thiboutot, 13 URB. LAW. 407, 407-08 (1981) (Supreme Court, in its
1979-80 term, substantially increased potential local government liability under § 1983).
2. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972); see infra notes 75-85 and accompa-
nying text.
3. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). But see generally Peters, supra note
I (increased municipal liability).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
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violations "under color of' state law.5
Some commentators have suggested that the restrictive reading
of section 1983 is based more on a concern for federal dockets
than for states' rights.' In Rizzo v. Goode,7 however, the Court
declared that "principles of federalism" prohibit relief under sec-
tion 1983 in all but the most extreme circumstances when the de-
fendant is a city police department.8 While the true intent of the
decision is open to debate,9 commentators view Rizzo as a nearly
absolute bar to relief by individuals against municipal police
forces.10
State courts and state governments have responded differently
to the Court's new concern for "federalism." Some state courts
have read into their state constitutions protections of individual
rights which exceed those found by the Supreme Court in the fed-
eral Constitution." A unique response by the state of Penn-
sylvania was recently approved by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. Porter.2 There, the court held
that a state may, as parens patriae,'3 seek injunctive relief under
section 1983 against a municipality for violations of the civil rights
of local residents.14
This Note examines the historical background of section
1983," 5 and evaluates the impact on the statute of cases such as
Rizzo.16 After concluding that Rizzo's federalism concerns may
be unjustified, 7 the Note explores the nature of the parens patriae
remedy.' 8 The opinion in Porter is then analyzed to determine
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. Id; see infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 71.
7. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
8. Id. at 379.
9. See infra note 105 and text accompanying note 106.
10. See infra notes 103 & 115.
11. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489 (1977).
12. 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
13. "'Parenspatriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." Alfred L. Snapp & Son
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 n.8 (1982) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979)). For a more extensive treatment of parens patriae, see infra
notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 143-96 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 23-70 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 71-115 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
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whether concerns for state autonomy are properly accommodated
by allowing the state, rather than the individual, to bring an action
under section 1983.19
Finally, the Note addresses some of the political and jurispru-
dential issues which are raised by allowing such a suit.2 0 After
noting the clash of interests between state and local governments
inherent in a case like Porter,21 the Note concludes with a discus-
sion of the possible benefits which the parens patriae suit may
confer on civil rights litigation.2
I. HISTORY OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,23 passed in response to President Grant's request for emer-
gency legislation to quell the state of anarchy existing in the South
due to state inaction in the face of Ku Klux Klan atrocities.24 The
ineffectiveness of state courts in securing equal protection of the
laws demanded a federal remedy to protect constitutional rights.
2 5
Section 1, the least controversial portion of the Act,26 created a
private remedy for individuals who, "under color of' state action,
were deprived "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution."2 7
Beliefs that the Civil Rights Act would grant full equality to
the freedman, and fears that it would destroy the sovereignty .of
the Southern States, were quickly dispelled by the federal courts,
19. See infra notes 144-96 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
23. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-86 (1976)). The full
title of the Act was "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, and for other purposes."
24. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133,
1153 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Section 1983]. President Grant's message
read in pertinent part:
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the states of the Union rendering life
and property insecure, and the carrying of the mails and collection of the revenue
dangerous. .. . That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of
state authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United
States, acting within the limits of the existing laws is sufficient for present emer-
gencies is not clear.
Id. at n.106.
25. The congressional debates continually emphasize the inaction of state courts, al-
luding to their domination by the Klan. Id. at 1154-55.
26. Id. at 1155.
27. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (currently codified with identical language at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976)).
1983]
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which subordinated the protection of national civil rights to the
protection of state sovereignty.2" In The Slaughterhouse Cases,29
the Supreme Court gave a restrictive meaning to the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment-and thus to
the parallel clause of the Act of 187 1.30 The Court rejected coun-
sel's argument that the fourteenth amendment "consolidated the
several [states] into a consistent whole"3 and placed the states
"under the oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Con-
gress."3 2 Instead, the Court interpreted the privileges and immu-
nities clause narrowly, holding that it protected only those rights
which "owe their existence to the Federal government, its Na-
tional character, its Constitution, or its laws."'3 3 A broader inter-
pretation would destroy the autonomy of the states and make the
Supreme Court "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to
nullify such acts as it did not approve as consistent with these
rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amend-
ment."' 34  Four years later in United States v. Cruikshank,35 the
Court reiterated its restrictive position, holding that the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed the right to petition for redress of griev-
ances only if the petition was directed to the federal government.
In addition to reading "privileges and immunities" so nar-
rowly as to make it irrelevant, the federal courts also gave a strict
28. Developments-Section 1983, supra note 24, at 1161.
29. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
30. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 1789-1957 at 83-85, 95 (1958).
31. 83 U.S. at 52.
32. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 30, at 83.
33. 83 U.S. at 79. The Court enumerated these "rights and privileges" as the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the writ of habeas corpus, the
right to use the navigable waters of the United States, rights secured by treaties with for-
eign nations, the right to become a citizen of any state by residence in that state, and those
rights secured by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 79-80.
34. Id. at 78. One commentator describes The Slaughterhouse Cases as "the most im-
portant single action, whether for good or evil, taken by the Supreme Court for the preser-
vation of state autonomy." J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 30, at 85. Others focus on the
civil rights aspects of the case instead of its federal-state issues, concluding that the Court's
narrow reading "effectively exclud[ed] almost all civil rights from [the 14th amendment's]
purview." Developments-Section 1983, supra note 24, at 1157-58.
35. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Cruikshank involved prosecution under the Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1981, 1987-91, 1993
(1976)), of three persons charged with disrupting a meeting of blacks in Louisiana and
subsequently lynching two blacks. Since the meeting was not aimed at petitioning the
United States government for redress of grievances, the Court held that the 14th amend-
ment was inapplicable and overturned the convictions.
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construction to "state action" under the fourteenth amendment
and the corollary phrase "under color of' in section 1983. Thus,
action by state officials without the state's sanction was not "state
action," 36 and only action in pursuance of state law or within ex-
ecutive discretion was found to be action "under color of' state
law.3
7
The doubly restrictive reading of "privileges and immunities"
and "under color of' made the fourteenth amendment and the
Civil Rights Acts essentially meaningless. 38  Thus, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee could hold that a state act making interracial
marriage a felony was not affected by the thirteenth, fourteenth, or
fifteenth amendments, or by the Civil Rights Acts.39 Similarly,
state court decisions upholding Jim Crow legislation remained un-
challenged in federal courts,4° and one federal court held that a
plaintiff who alleged that the chief of police had assaulted and
beaten her with a whip was without a cause of action under the
Act of 187 1.41 It is not surprising that only twenty-one cases were
brought under section 1983 from 1871 to 1920.42 The federal judi-
ciary's overriding concern for preserving state autonomy acted
substantially to curtail protection of individual liberties.4 3
A. The Expanding Scope of Section 1983
The concern for preserving states' prerogatives, characterized
36. In Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904), the Supreme Court held that
it lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction preventing construction of a subway tunnel,
which plaintiff alleged was being built in violation of a state statute. Since the construction
was not authorized by statute, it was not state action, despite the fact that it was undertaken
by the City of New York. Id. at 437-38. See Dev'elopments-Section 1983, supra note 24,
at 1160 n.138.
37. Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909); United States v. Jackson, 26 F.
Cas. 563, 563-64 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 15, 459). See Developments-Section 1983, supra
note 24, at 1160 n.138.
38. See P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT wITH DEATH 243 (1975).
39. Lonas v. Tennessee, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287 (1871).
40. See, e.g., Bowie v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co., 27 So. 1016 (Ala. 1900).
41. Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909). The court stated that "the right
of an individual to life, liberty, and property, and to be free from molestation, is primarily
and originally the right of a citizen of the state of which the individual is an inhabitant."
Id. at 966.
42. Developments-Section 1983, supra note 24, at 1161 n.139. The authors state that
"as late as 1953, the statute was still relatively ineffective." Id.
43. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding §§ 1 and 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 "repugnant to the Tenth Amendment" because they sought to
prevent private discrimination and thus superseded state legislatures' control of private
conduct). See generally J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 30, at 83-88, 94-96, 98-100.
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as "dual federalism," 44 pervaded civil rights litigation throughout
the first part of the twentieth century. Though the Court used the
fourteenth amendment to strike down unconstitutional state
laws, 45 it was not until 1941, in United States v. Classic,46 that the
criminal sanctions of the Civil Rights Acts47 were applied to state
officials who, in violating state laws, infringed on fourteenth
amendment rights. In Classic, the Court held that if state officials
misuse their positions and thereby violate federal laws, they act
"under color of" state law.48
Four years later, in Screws v. United States,49 the Court ap-
plied the same rule to local law enforcement officers who arrested,
handcuffed, and beat to death a black man.50 Justice Douglas
stated in his plurality opinion:
The problem is not whether state law has been violated but
whether an inhabitant of a State has been deprived of a federal
right by one who acts under "color of any law." He who acts
under "color" of law may be a federal officer or a state officer.
He may act under "color" of federal law or of state law. The
statute does not come into play merely because the federal law
or the state law under which the officer purports to act is vio-
lated. It is applicable when and only when someone is de-
prived of a federal right by that action. The fact that it is also a
violation of state law does not make it any the less a federal
offense punishable as such. Nor does its punishment by federal
authority encroach on state authority or relieve the state from
its responsibility for punishing state offenses. 5 '
The Screws and Classic decisions thus repudiated the notion
that the states have primary responsibility for federal civil rights
enforcement. Furthermore, they shifted the federal courts' focus
from preservation of "dual federalism" and state autonomy52 to
more vigorous protection of individual civil liberties. By ex-
panding the scope of the fourteenth amendment, the Court broad-
44. Developments-Section 1983, supra note 24, at 1159-61.
45. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (Jersey City officials enjoined from harassing
labor organizers; decision based on Ist and 14th amendments); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939) (striking down Oklahoma statute which disenfranchised all who failed to regis-
ter during 11 -day period); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas statute prohibit-
ing blacks from voting in Democratic primary held unconstitutional).
46. 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (fraudulent counting of primary ballots by state officials).
47. The suit in Classic was brought under §§ 19 and 20 of the Act of March 4, 1909,
ch. 321, 35 stat. 1092 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1976)).
48. 313 U.S. at 326.
49. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
50. Id. at 93.
51. Id. at 108.
52. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33:431
14RENS PATP.4E AND § 1983
ened the scope of interests protected under section 1983.53 The
district and curcuit courts quickly applied Screws and Classic to
the civil remedies of the Civil Rights Acts, thereby extending the
reach of the Acts to noncriminal cases. 4
Not until 1961, however, did the Supreme Court apply Screws
and Classic in the context of section 1983 actions. In the
landmark case of Monroe v. Pape,55 which significantly enlarged
the scope of section 1983,56 the Court allowed a complaint against
thirteen Chicago policemen who, plaintiff alleged, broke into and
ransacked his home without a warrant. 7 The Court compared
section 1983 with its criminal counterparts, upon which the ac-
tions in Screws and Classic were based. While acknowledging
that intent to violate constitutional rights is a prerequisite under
the criminal statutes, the Court held that the civil remedies of sec-
tion 1983 are available without a showing of intent.58 In addition,
the Monroe Court provided direct access to federal court for all
litigants deprived of their civil rights "under color of' state law.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found in the legislative
53. Developments-Section 1983, supra note 24, at 1169.
54. Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) (damage award for assault by police
officers); Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) (complaint alleging unlawful
detention by police without pressing charges stated § 1983 cause of action); Geach v. Moy-
nahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953) (federal court had jurisdiction over complaint alleging
warrantless search); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) (federal court took juris-
diction over complaint alleging that police officers violated plaintiffs' rights by ejecting
them from privately owned park open to public upon payment of fees); Sellers v. Johnson,
163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947) (injunction should issue to prevent enforcement of ordinance
barring religious groups from use of public park); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d
240 (3d Cir. 1945) (complaint alleging unlawful imprisonment by law enforcement officials
is cognizable under state and federal civil rights statutes), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947).
55. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
56. Dissenting from Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1977), Jus-
tice Rehnquist labeled Monroe "the fountainhead of the torrent of civil rights litigation of
the last 17 years." Id. at 724.
57. 365 U.S. at 187.
58. In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for
acts "wilfully" done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of
an act with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." 325 U.S. at
103. We do not think that gloss should be placed on [§ 1983]. The word
"wilfully" does not appear in [§ 1983]. Moreover, [§ 1983] provides a civil rem-
edy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law challenged on the
ground of vagueness. Section [1983] should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions.
365 U.S. at 187. By eliminating the analogy to the criminal laws, the Court reversed the
common practice in the district courts of dismissing § 1983 complaints that failed to allege
an intent to violate civil rights. See Kirkpatrick, Defiing a Constitutional Tort Under Sec-
tion 1983: The State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45, 46 (1977).
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history of the Act of 1871 that Congress intended to supplant state
law entirely by overriding discriminatory state laws and by pro-
viding a federal remedy where state laws were inadequate or
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was inade-
quate in practice.59 Justice Douglas stated that exhaustion of state
remedies was not required before bringing a section 1983 action:
"It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state rem-
edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked.,
60
The Monroe decision thus heralded a new era in civil rights
litigation. By transplanting Screws and Classic to the area of civil
liability, the Court shifted the primary responsibility for civil
rights enforcement to the federal courts. By ruling that federal
remedies were entirely supplementary to state remedies, the Court
provided direct access to the federal court system. By removing
the state-of-mind requirement for section 1983 liability, the Court
allowed federal court plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss sim-
ply by alleging facts showing that defendant's actions had de-
prived plaintiff of a federally guaranteed civil right. Coupled with
the trend toward full incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment,61 Monroe promised sweeping intervention
by the federal courts into areas once considered exclusively re-
served to the states.62
Monroe's impact was swift and dramatic. In 1960 roughly
three hundred suits were filed under all of the Civil Rights Acts;63
in 1972, approximately eight thousand suits were fied under sec-
tion 1983 alone.' 4 Since section 1983 is intended to remedy depri-
vations "under color of' state law,65 it was perhaps inevitable that
suits would be brought mainly against state officials and those em-
powered as agents of the state. Section 1983 plaintiffs have been
granted standing to sue state executive officials, 66 state hospital
59. 365 U.S. at 173-74.
60. Id. at 183.
61. See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
62. See, e.g., S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 83
(1965).
63. Depelopments--Section 1983, supra note 24, at 1136 n.7.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 4.
66. E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
[Vol. 33:431
PARAENS P.4TPJAE AND § 1983
district board members,67 law enforcement officers,68 municipal
officials,69 and school board members.70
B. The Revival of "Dual Federalism"
The increased scrutiny of state functions under section 1983,
and the resulting burden on federal court dockets, has caused
much concern in the last decade.71 This concern has inspired a
series of decisions drastically curtailing the scope of federal relief
available under section 1983 and similar statutes.72 Beginning as
a respect for the autonomy of state judicial functions7 3 the princi-
ple that federal courts should not intervene in state affairs has
spread until it now threatens to eliminate the very kind of federal
judicial supervision which section 1983 was intended to provide.74
The opening salvo in what one commentator calls "a counter-
assault on federal judicial power"75 was fired in the case of
Younger v. Harris.76 Harris had been indicted under the Califor-
nia Criminal Syndicalism Act.77 He filed a complaint in federal
district court claiming that the Act inhibited his exercise of first
amendment rights. A three-judge district court granted the in-
junction,7 and District Attorney Younger appealed, claiming that
the court's action violated the Anti-Injunction Act.7 9
Justice Black, writing for the majority, found that Congress
had always "manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state
cases free from interference by federal courts."80 Justice Black
67. Heath v. Redbud Hosp. Dist., 436 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
68. Eg., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973).
69. E.g., Birnbaum v. Tressel, 347 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1965).
70. Eg., Endicott v. Van Petten, 330 F. Supp. 878 (D. Kan. 1971).
71. See, e.g., Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557;
Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 549.
72. See infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
73. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see infra notes 75-83 and accompanying
text.
74. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
75. Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1977).
76. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982). The Act makes it a felony to aid
or advocate the commission of crimes as a means of effecting political change.
78. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The Act reads: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State Court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."
80. 401 U.S. at 43. For an exhaustive critique of the historical and precedential un-
19831
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found support for this congressional policy in "the notion of 'com-
ity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions. . . and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their sepa-
rate functions in their separate ways."8 The idea of "Our Feder-
alism," he said, requires sensitivity to a system in which "the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do
so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activi-
ties of the States."82
The enduring legacy of Younger is its concern with "Our Fed-
eralism" and its conception that there are areas of state activity
beyond the reach of federal intervention. 3 The "vague undefined
notions of equity, comity and federalism"84 articulated in Younger
remain available to prevent federal intervention, despite subse-
quent findings that such restraint is unwarranted.8 1 If the federal-
ism concerns in Younger had been confined simply to federal
intervention in state judicial proceedings, the decision's impact on
section 1983 would be less drastic. 86
But the Younger abstention doctrine has not been so confined.
In Juidice v. Vail,7 the Court extended Younger's noninterference
doctrine to contempt proceedings in state court.8 8 The most far-
reaching extension of the Younger doctrine, one which threatens
to erode section 1983 altogether, is the 1976 case of Rizzo v.
Goode. 89
derpinnings of Justice Black's Younger analysis, see Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Crimi-
nalLaw and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740, 866-96 (1974).
81. 401 U.S. at 44.
82. Id.
83. This notion survived the Court's subsequent holding in Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225 (1972), that § 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. After affirming that
§ 1983 was intended to allow federal courts to intervene in state court proceedings, the
Mitchum Court concluded: "[W]e do not question or qualify in any way the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a
state court proceeding." Id. at 243; see Wechsler, supra note 80, at 877-80.
84. Brennan, supra note 11, at 502.
85. See supra note 83.
86. See Zeigler, An Accommodation ofthe Younger Doctrine and the Duty ofthe Fed-
eral Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 266, 290-300 (1976).
87. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
88. The Court reasoned that since "It]he contempt power lies at the core of the admin-
istration of a State's judicial system," it is a legitmate state activity with which the federal
government cannot interfere. Id. at 335. Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissent, accused the
Court of "stripping all meaningful content from 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 342.
89. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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In a class action brought on behalf of minority citizens and
residents of Philadelphia, Rizzo's plaintiffs sought broad injunc-
tive relief for widespread police misconduct.90 The district court
found repeated civil rights violations, including arrests without
probable cause, use of excessive force to subdue suspects, and har-
assment of Philadelphia's minority residents.9' Finding that ex-
isting complaint procedures were inadequate,9 2 the district court
ordered the police department to draw up new procedures. 93 The
Third Circuit unanimously affirmed, noting that the district
court's order was "limited and moderate in tone indicating its
faith in the ability and willingness of the police department to in-
vestigate and correct the transgressions of its errant members. De-
spite the assertions of the defendants, the court is not thrusting
itself into the day to day operations of the police department."94
In the face of this unanimous affirmation-and over objections
voiced by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in its amicus curiae
brief 95-the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court challenged the district court opinion on three
grounds. First, the Court asserted that no "case or controversy"
existed.96 In seeking the overhaul of police disciplinary proce-
dures, the plaintiffs had based their claim not upon fear of future
police misconduct but upon fear of misconduct stemming from
police perceptions of those disciplinary procedures.97 Somehow
finding significance in this distinction, the Court declared that the
plaintiffs "lacked the requisite 'personal stake in the outcome.' "98
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the case or controversy issue
90. Council of Orgs. on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility v.
Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aft'dsub nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d
Cir. 1974), rey'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
91. The district court's findings of fact with regard to police abuse occupied 23 pages
of its opinion. 357 F. Supp. at 1294-1316.
92. For example, no records of civilian complaints were kept by the police department
unless complaints were made in writing. No forms were made available for filing such
complaints. When a written complaint was submitted, "the general practice. . . [was] not
to record [it]." Id. at 1292.
93. Id. at 1321.
94. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d at 547-48 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
95. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 384 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). To the
extent that Rizzo is based on a concern for federalism, the reversal over the protests of
Pennsylvania is particularly puzzling. The state's brief was a signal to the Court that Penn-
sylvania welcomed federal intervention, yet the Court held that concern for states' rights
prohibited intervention. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
96. 423 U.S. at 371-73.
97. Id. at 372.
98. Id. at 372-73 (citations omitted).
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was not before it on appeal, since the defendants had failed to
contest the plaintiffs' standing as a class.99
Next, the Court discussed the merits of the plaintiffs' section
1983 case. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist objected to
the premise that section 1983 imposed a constitutional duty on the
police to eliminate future misconduct. He also rejected the prem-
ise that if such a duty existed, a pattern of police misconduct
would indicate a "default" of that duty justifying federal interven-
tion. l°° "We have never subscribed to these amorphous proposi-
tions, and we decline to do so now."' 0 ' The Court held that
equitable relief could not be granted because "the responsible au-
thorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any members
of the [plaintiff class] of any constitutional rights."0 2
Had the Court stopped there, Rizzo would have represented a
holding that the level of proof for section 1983 claims against local
agencies is very high103 -a restrictive' °  but not fatal reading of
the statute. This part of the Rizzo decision would have provided a
presumption of nonliability in cases brought against supervisory
officials, and thus restricted federal intervention into local munici-
pal affairs.'0 5
But the Rizzo Court intended more than a mere examination
of the state-of-mind requirement in section 1983 suits. Certiorari
was granted to decide whether the district court's injunction was
99. Id. at 373.
100. Id. at 376.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 377.
103. The Court seems to have established that institutional violations can be
shown only by proving either that superior authorities issued explicit instructions
directing subordinates to commit unconstitutional acts, or that there existed a pat-
tern of unconstitutional behavior by subordinate officials of such magnitude, du-
ration, and scope that one would have to be blind not to characterize it as official
policy.
Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties.: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right,
54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723, 756-57 (1979).
104. In dissenting from the Court's restrictive view of § 1983 liability, Justice Black-
mun noted that Monroe had identified neglect in enforcing federal rights as one of the evils
to be cured by § 1983. 423 U.S. at 384-85. He characterized the Court's holding that super-
visory officials were exempt from § 1983 liability for the acts of subordinates as "cast[ing]
aside reasoned conclusions to the contrary reached by the Courts of Appeals of 10 Cir-
cuits." Id. at 385.
105. Durchslag, supra note 103, at 757. The level of liability required in § 1983 suits
had varied widely in the federal courts since Monroe. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 58, at
46-49. Some circuit courts have read Rizzo as a burden of proof decision, minimizing the
later federalism discussion. See Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980); Bolding v.
Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978).
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"an unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discre-
tionary authority committed to [state and local officials] by state
and local law to perform their official functions."" The Court's
concern that the federal judiciary had inserted itself into what was
essentially a local controversy'07 led it to consider not only the
appropriateness of this particular intervention, but also whether
the federal courts could ever intervene in suits of this nature.10 8
Echoing the concerns expressed in its Younger decision, 0 9 the
Court held that "principles of equity .. .militate against the
grant of an injunction [against state officials] except in the most
extraordinary circumstances. "" 10
The Rizzo decision applied the Younger abstention doctrine in
a new setting-not only are state judicial proceedings protected
from federal intervention,"' but state and local executive func-
tions as well." 2 Thus, the Court has attempted to insulate state
actors from the very kind of federal remedy which the Act of 1871
was intended to provide." 3 Rizzo reversed forty years of federal
law and revived concern for state integrity as a legitimate defense
in section 1983 suits." 4 Particularly in the area of police miscon-
duct, it seems that federal injunctive relief will be granted only in
the most extreme circumstances, if at all.' '5
Since the federal courts seem unwilling to interfere with gov-
ernmental functions like police protection"I6 traditionally reserved
to the states," 7 the task of monitoring police departments may
106. 423 U.S. at 366.
107. Id. at 371.
108. Id. at 373-81.
109. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
110. 423 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
111. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
112. See Weinberg, supra note 75, at 1195 ("By a coup de main the Rizzo Court trans-
planted the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, which since 1971 has blocked federal injunctions
against state proceedings, to the much more complex and sensitive area of federal injun-
tions against state officials.") (citations omitted).
113. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
115. Weinberg, supra note 75, at 1220 ("It now seems to be the view of the majority
that neither isolated nor systematic police misconduct can be an appropriate subject for
federal judicial supervision.") (citations omitted).
116. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
117. Id. at 852. But see EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1060 (1983):
The principle of immunity articulated in NationalLeague of Cities is a functional
doctrine, however, whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred province of
state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits of a federal system in
which the States enjoy a "separate and independent existence" not be lost through
undue federal interference in certain core state functions.
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have fallen to the states. If federalism means a genuine concern
for state prerogatives and is not simply a device for denying sec-
tion 1983 relief altogether, the states should take a more active
supervisory role in the area of civil rights. One possible vehicle
for such supervision is the parens patriae role of the states.
II. THE PARENS PATRIAE SUIT
The parens patriae suit grew out of the English common law
prerogatives of the King,"' who was charged with the duty to
"take care of such of his subjects, as are legally unable. . to take
proper care of themselves and their property.""' 9 Through the
Chancery courts, the King acted as the general guardian of per-
sons mentally incapable of suing on their own behalf.' 2° He also
had general superintendence of all charities.' 2' In the United
States, it has long been recognized that these prerogative powers
are reserved to the states as sovereigns. 122 While a state may not
sue as parens patriae to shield its citizens from federal law,'23 it
may sue to assure that the benefts of federal law are not denied
them. 24 The federal government's role as "ultimate parens pa-
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
118. Blackstone defines "prerogative" as:
That special pre-eminence which the King hath over and above all other persons,
and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his royal dignity. It
signifies... something that is required or demanded before, or in preference to,
all others. And hence it follows, that it must be in its nature singular and eccentri-
cal; that it can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the King
enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others; and not to those which he enjoys in
common with any of his subjects; for if once any prerogative of the Crown could
be held in common with the subject, it would cease to be a prerogative any longer.
J. CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 4 (London
1820 & photo. reprint 1978) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239). This dis-
tinction between suits by a sovereign as general representative of his subjects (or citizens)
and suits brought on behalf of private persons who also may sue (which are not parens
patriae suits) is critically important in analyzing parens patriae actions. See infra notes
130-42 and accompanying text.
119. J. CHITTY, supra note 118, at 155.
120. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) ("For example, Blackstone
refers to the sovereign or his representative as 'the general guardian of all infants, idiots,
and lunatics,'. . .") (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47).
121. J. CHITTY, supra note 118, at 161-62.
122. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854).
123. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923) ("It cannot be conceded that a
State, asparenspatriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United
States from the operation of the statutes thereof."); see Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S.
886 (1970) (state has no right to challenge the draft). Refusal of standing in these cases is
based on the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide essentially political questions. 17 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4047, at 157 (1978).
124. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 (1982)
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triae" has been invoked defensively when states sue to prevent en-
forcement of federal laws. 12
5
In addition to suits brought under the modem equivalent of
the King's prerogative, parens patriae standing has been expanded
to allow states to sue in a "quasi-sovereign" capacity.' 26 The in-
terests of the state as quasi-sovereign are distinct from its proprie-
tary interests.' 27  Proprietary interests are those which a state
possesses as landowner;1 28 since the states have yielded the right to
use diplomacy or force to resolve their disputes, 29 they are
granted standing to resolve grievances under the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court.130
When suing as parens patriae and invoking quasi-sovereign
interests, the states are not merely protecting their rights as land-
owners.' 3 ' The requirement of a quasi-sovereign interest is di-
rectly linked to the King's prerogative, 132 and is intended to insure
that the states, as parens patriae, are not bringing actions which
(Puerto Rico had standing to sue under Wagner-Peyser Act and Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 to enjoin preferential hiring and treatment of foreign laborers vis-a-vis
Puerto Ricans; state may "seek to assure its residents that they will have the full benefit of
federal laws"); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (Court consid-
ered state's 15th amendment claim, though rejecting it on the merits).
125. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1908). The United States may sue to
protect its proprietary interests. See, e.g., United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S.
273 (1888) (United States may sue to protect its interest in allegedly fraudulent land pat-
ents). This requires proof of a direct interest similar to that required of any other plaintiff.
In United States v. Brand Jewelers, 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the United
States was granted standing to sue as parens patriae for injunctive relief to prevent wide-
spread denial of due process in civil proceedings. The case has been widely criticized. See,
e.g., Recent Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1930-39 (1971); Recent Decisions, 37 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 426, 426-33 (1971). Most courts ignore the case, holding that specific statutory
authorization is required to confer standing upon the United States as parens patriae plain-
tiff. See, eg, United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
126. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
127. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.
128. Id.
129. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 665, 669 (1959).
130. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, provides: "In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other pub-
lic Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction." However, Congress may grant concurrent jurisdiction to
the lower federal courts, and has done so in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) (diversity jurisdic-
tion). In 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I) (1976), the Supreme Court is given original jurisdiction of
all suits between two or more states.
131. This distinction has not always been clear to the federal courts. See, e.g., Penn-
sylvania v. National Ass'n. of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 22 (3d Cir. 1975); Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (blurring the concepts of proprietary and
quasi-sovereign interests).
132. See supra note 118.
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present "a mere 'collectivity of private suits.' "133 While no pre-
cise definition of quasi-sovereign interests has been formulated, 134
the Supreme Court's decisions indicate that the requirement is in-
tended to insure that the state "has an interest apart from that of
the individuals affected. ' 35 In West Virginia v. Pfizer, 3 6 the court
listed the kinds of interests which have supported parens patriae
standing: "the 'health, comfort, and welfare' of the people, inter-
state water rights, pollution-free interstate waters, protection of
the air from interstate pollutants, and the general economy of the
state." 137 That private citizens may have standing does not bar a
parens patriae suit if the state can show an interest separate from
that of the private parties. 138 Only in cases where the state is pur-
suing the interests of individual citizens instead of general state
interests is parens patriae standing inappropriate. 39
By bearing in mind the requirement of general injury to state
interests and the prohibition of state suits to vindicate purely pri-
133. 17 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 123, § 4047, at 156-57 (quoting Penn-
sylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 666 (1976)).
134. The Court recognized this problem in Snapp, noting that the vagueness of the
quasi-sovereign prerogatives of states presented Article III standing problems. 458 U.S. at
602. While describing quasi-sovereign interests as consisting of "a set of interests that the
state has in the well-being of its populace," the Court could not provide a more precise
definition; it concluded that "[tihe vagueness of this concept can only be filled in by turning
to individual cases." Id.
135. Id. at 605 (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923)).
136. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
137. Id. at 1089.
138. In almost any case invoking the general welfare as the source of state standing, the
welfare of private individuals is bound to be involved. Individual economic interests are
implicated in each of the quasi-sovereign interests enumerated by the Pfizer court. See
supra text accompanying note 137. The pollution of interstate waters, for example, affects
the rights of private landowners. Merely because individual residents have a cause of ac-
tion, the state's interest in "the well-being of its populace," Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602, is not
suspended. Regardless of wrongs to individuals, the state's duty to the public continues.
Thus, because private actions and parens patriae actions seek to vindicate fundamentally
different interests (private interests on one hand and the public interest on the other), they
are not mutually exclusive. Cf. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 605 (quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) ("[T]he State, as representative of the public, has an
interest apart from that of the individuals affected.")); id. at 604 (quoting Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("[T]he State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens .. ")). Although the existence of a private action does
not bar parens patriae suits for injunctive relief, damage suits by the state as parens patriae
have been barred where private actions are available, in order to avoid duplicative recov-
eries. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1972) (denying parens patriae
standing under the private treble-damage provision of the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976)).
139. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 ("In order to maintain [a parens patriae action], the
state must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private par-
ties .. "); 17 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 123, § 4047, at 156-57.
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vate rights, the nature of quasi-sovereign interests becomes clear.
In suing as parens patriae, the state must seek to enforce or vindi-
cate a duty owed to its citizens."4° If the state can show that a
defendant's actions impair its ability to conduct its own affairs and
to fulfill the legitimate expectations of its citizens toward state
government, 14 parens patriae standing should be granted. 142
III. PENNSYLVAN4 V. PORTER
Until 1979, parens patriae standing had never been granted to
a state under section 1983. To determine whether such standing is
appropriate, it is necessary to analyze the types of interests which
a state might seek to protect through such a suit. The case of
Pennsylvania v. Porter,43 where such standing was first granted,
offers an opportunity to examine these interests.
A. Factual Background
Porter came before the Third Circuit as an appeal from an
injunction granted by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. 1" The sweeping injunction 145
was granted to remedy the actions of a Millvale, Pennsylvania po-
liceman (Frank L. Baranyai), and the inaction of the borough
council, chief of police, and mayor.'46 The district court found
that Baranyai repeatedly beat, harassed, illegally arrested, and il-
legally detained Millvale citizens and visitors, and retaliated
against borough residents who complained to the police chief and
borough council. 14 7 Despite convictions on one count of simple
140. Cf. J. CHrrrv, supra note 118; text accompanying note 119 (defining King's
prerogative).
141. Cf. Tribe, Unravelling National League of Cities: The New Federalism andAffirm-
ative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076 (1977) (reading
National League of Cities as recognizing "the existence of protected expectations--of
rights-to basic government services.").
142. Distinct from but related to the general well-being of its residents, the State
has an interest in securing observance of the terms under which it participates in
the federal system. In the context ofparenspatriae actions, this means ensuring
that the State and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow
from participation in the federal system.
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607-08.
143. 480 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Pa. 1979), af§'d, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
458 U.S. at 1121 (1982).
144. Id.
145. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
146. 480 F. Supp. at 688 (findings 5-8).
147. Id. at 689-90 (findings 19-23).
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assault and two counts of official oppression, 48 as well as numer-
ous citizen complaints, Baranyai was never suspended, repri-
manded, or disciplined by the other defendants. 49 The district
court enjoined all defendants from further illegal behavior, and
restricted Baranyai to desk duty.' 50
Porter's factual resemblance to Rizzo is striking;' 5 ' thus, the
defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that Rizzo prevented the
court from interfering with police operations.'5 2 But the motion
to dismiss was denied.'53 The district court distinguished Rizzo,
since in Porter individual defendants were named and a definite
policy of intimidation by police officials was shown.' 54 The court
also held that balancing "federal equitable power and state ad-
ministration of its own laws" was unnecessary because Penn-
sylvania had intervened as a plaintiff' 55
The defendants then moved to dismiss Pennsylvania as a
plaintiff' 56 The district court first inquired whether Pennsylvania
could obtain sufficient relief in state court.'57 After finding that
"procedures under Pennsylvania law are so cumbersome and inef-
fectual in a civil rights case as to leave citizens without an ade-
quate remedy at law,"' 58 the court upheld the state's standing to
sue as parens patriae.
Standing was the main issue addressed by the Third Circuit on
appeal. Though certain aspects of the district court's injunction
148. Id. at 690 (findings 31-33).
149. Id. at 691 (findings 34, 37-42).
150. 659 F.2d 306, 312 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981).
151. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
152. 480 F. Supp. at 693-94.
153. Id. at 694.
154. Id. This aspect of the district court ruling addressed the state-of-mind concerns of
the Rizzo Court. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
155. 480 F. Supp. at 694. This aspect of the ruling addressed the federalism concerns of
Rizzo. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
156. 480 F. Supp. at 694-95.
157. Id. at 695. This inquiry appears to be based on the theory that a § 1983 plaintiff
must exhaust state remedies before federal relief is available. Such an approach is ques-
tionable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426,
433-34 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974).
158. 480 F. Supp. at 701. Under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 46190-46191 (Purdon Supp.
1983), Baranyai had the right to a hearing before a civil service commission before removal
or reduction in rank, and could appeal the commission's ruling in the courts. Since the
mayor, the council, and the police chief were named defendants, and were the very persons
authorized to suspend or remove Baranyai, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53 §§ 46121, 46124 (Pur-
don 1966 & Supp. 1983), it is unlikely that any disciplinary action would have been taken
without court intervention. Thus, the case falls within Monroe's category of§ 1983 actions
justified because state laws are inadequate. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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were modified," 9 Pennsylvania's standing as parens patriae was
affirmed in a majority opinion by Judge Gibbons. 6 °
Three judges dissented in part, claiming "a complete and utter
absence of allegations and proof to sustain parens patriae
standing."''
B. Analsis of "Sovereign Interests"
Judge Gibbons' analysis of Pennsylvania's standing to sue was
supported by four other judges. The first interest cited in support
of Pennsylvania's standing was its interest in upholding the Con-
stitution. "The fourteenth amendment is the supreme law of the
land in all of Pennsylvania," wrote Judge Gibbons.162 Violations
of the fourteenth amendment by local officials interfere with the
duty of state officials to uphold the Constitution, and undermine
public confidence in state and local government institutions. 63
Judge Gibbons' opinion echoed Justice Brandeis's dissent in Oln-
stead v. United States:'64
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Gov-
ernment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself, it invites anarchy.165
The problem with basing parens patriae standing on the state's
duty to uphold the law is that such a standard is limitless. It is one
thing to say that government must obey the law; it is another to
impose upon government a sovereign duty to intervene whenever
and wherever the law is broken. Few would deny, for example,
that the state has an interest in the free flow of commerce within
its borders; 166 yet few would argue that such an interest supports
159. The Third Circuit found that the record did not support an injunction against the
borough council, and that Baranyai had left the employment of the Millvale Police Depart-
ment. The section of the injunction which enjoined all defendants from "further engaging
in [unconstitutional] conduct .. . or participating in violations of this injunction by
Baranyai" was struck down, as was part of the injunction which forbade employing
Baranyai, insofar as the injunction was directed at the borough council. 659 F.2d at 338.
160. Id. at 319.
161. Id. at 334 (Garth, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 315.
163. Id.
164. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
165. Id. at 485.
166. In fact, this interest has been the basis for parens patriae standing in some cases.
See, eg., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450-52 (1945) (antitrust).
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the right of the state to intervene in breach of contract actions
between private individuals and municipal employees. Quasi-sov-
ereign interests evolve from duties and obligations of states to
their citizens.167 In most cases, the state has met its duty when it
provides a forum for dispute resolution; its intervention as plain-
tiff is unnecessary.
The second state interest supporting Pennsylvania's standing,
according to Judge Gibbons, was its interest in protecting the gen-
eral health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Citing Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia 168 to support this proposition,169 Judge Gibbons
analogized the state's duty to protect its citizens from physical
abuse to its duty to protect them from toxic wastes or unsafe
automobiles.'70 Basing parens patriae standing on this analogy is
also problematic; the state's duty to ensure the health, safety, and
welfare is, if anything, less evident than its duty to enforce the
fourteenth amendment. Moreover, it is the role of the legislature,
not the executive (or the attorney general), to define the general
health, safety, and welfare of the state, and to enact legislation to
enable the attorney general to protect those interests.
Judge Gibbons added that the state should not have to rely on
the happenstance of private suits to vindicate its citizens' section
1983 rights.' This portion of the opinion was apparently based
upon the theory that the state should act to supplement federal
enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts.'72 The problem here, as
before, is that absent a clear enabling statute, no duty of prosecu-
tion, and hence no parens patriae standing, can be shown. Section
1983 was not intended to grant a cause of action to states; instead it
was intended to remedy state action in violation of federal law. 17 3
The real basis for granting parens patriae standing in Porter
was the existence of a statute which enabled-in fact re-
quired-the state attorney general to bring suit for violations of
167. See supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
168. 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
169. 659 F.2d at 315 n.ll.
170. Id. at 315.
171. Id.
172. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Suits by a State as Parens Patriae, 48 N.C.L. REV.
963, 969 (1970). In the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), Congress endorsed the concept of "private attorneys general" in enforcing the Civil
Rights Acts. An amicus brief filed in Porter argued that Pennsylvania's standing was
analogous to that of a "private attorney general." Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union at 11-12, Porter.
173. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
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state laws.1 74 The effect of such a statute is to create legitimate
expectations that the state as sovereign will act to protect the inter-
ests of its citizens.175 Without an enabling statute, no sovereign
power is conferred; 176 upon passage of the statute, a duty arises. 177
Judge Garth's dissent asserted that the availability of private
relief foreclosed parens patriae standing for Pennsylvania, 178 a po-
sition unsupported by Supreme Court decisions.' 79 While the dis-
sent correctly noted that the state may not volunteer to litigate
purely personal claims, 8° parens patriae standing is nevertheless
appropriate where the state is acting in pursuance of a sovereign
duty or to vindicate a sovereign interest. 81 The current law on
parens patriae standing and individual interests is perhaps best
stated in Puerto Rico ex rel Quiros v. Bramkamp:I82
[A] state seeking to proceed asparenspatriae need not demon-
strate the inability of private persons to obtain relief ifparens
patriae standing is otherwise indicated. Rather "[t]he argu-
ments in favor of allowing such standing become less compel-
ling, as it becomes more feasible to achieve complete relief
through suits by the parties actually aggrieved."'183
Individual relief in Porter was highly unlikely in view of the fed-
eralism concerns expressed in Rizzo 184
Judge Garth also objected to parens patriae standing because
the harm was not widespread. 5 Such standing would be
appropriate
[w]hen all members of a community, state or federal, are sub-
174. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 294(b) (Purdon 1962) (repealed 1980) provided: "The
Department of Justice shall have the power, and its duty shall be, with the approval of the
Governor: . .. (b) To take such steps, and adopt such means, as may be reasonably nec-
essary to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth." (Emphasis added.)
175. See supra note 141.
176. "The absolute sovereignty of the will of the majority is the essence of democratic
government." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 246 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
177. Courts criticizing United States v. Brand Jewelers, 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), have held that the attorney general may not sue for due process and other violations
in the absence of enabling legislation. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644
F.2d 187, 201-03 (3d Cir. 1980). Where such enabling legislation exists, the sovereign will
of the people has been expressed and the executive must give effect to that expression.
178. 659 F.2d at 328-29.
179. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
180. 659 F.2d at 328. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
181. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607-08.
182. 654 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1981).
183. Id. at 217 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Shapp v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 n.42
(D.C. Cir. 1976)).
184. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
185. 659 F.2d at 334.
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ject to injury .... I hasten to note, however, that in this case,
the harm alleged .. .was limited to an exceedingly small
number of the Millvale community-no more than fifty indi-
viduals-a far cry from all members of the [state]
community.186
While considerable support exists for a community-wide harm re-
quirement,187 an examination of the underlying policy behind the
requirement discloses an intent to prevent state intervention in es-
sentially private suits.1
88
The problem with requiring state-wide (or community-wide)
harm is that it confuses the extent of harm to quasi-sovereign in-
terests with the nature of the interests themselves.' 89 The argu-
ment, if pursued, would result in an impermissible disparity in
treatment between cities and towns in the same state. If, for ex-
ample, the residents of Philadelphia (population 1,688,210)9 al-
lege infringement of their voting rights (or the rights of a large
percentage of the population), sheer numbers would create a case
186. Id. at 330 (emphasis in original).
187. See, e.g., Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 632 F.2d 365, 369
(4th Cir. 1980) ("The decisions have generally agreed that a substantial portion of the pop-
ulation must be affected in order that the sovereign may represent them in aparenspatriae
capacity."), aff'd, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
188. The community-wide harm requirement is a standard which merely seeks to en-
sure that the state's quasi-sovereign interests are at stake. See Snapp, 632 F.2d at 369
(describing scope of harm as a measure of quasi-sovereign interests). Quasi-sovereign in-
terests are invariably described in community-wide terms. See, e.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602
("a set of interests that the state has in the well-being of its populace") (emphasis added).
They may not be invoked unless the "injury to the state's economy or the health and wel-
fare of its citizens. . . [is] sufficiently severe and generalized." Pennsylvania ex rel. Shapp
v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). But the community- wide
harm requirement is overly strict. A majority of citizens need not be harmed before a
state's quasi-sovereign interests are implicated. Id. Thus, the community-wide harm re-
quirement acts as much to deone quasi-sovereign interests as to determine their applicabil-
ity to a given set of facts.
The Supreme Court in Snapp impliedly rejected the community-wide harm require-
ment when it declined "to draw any definitive limits on the proportion of the population of
the state that must be adversely affected by the challenged behavior." 458 U.S. at 607.
Instead, the Court offered a general test for parens patriae standing:
One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and
welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue asparenspatrlae is
whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to ad-
dress through its sovereign lawmaking powers.
Id. The State would only employ its "sovereign lawmaking powers" where a broad general
interest was at stake, see id. at n. 14; it would not use its legislative powers merely to resolve
a private dispute. Thus, parens patriae standing is appropriate not strictly in the face of
community-wide harm, but whenever a general public interest is threatened.
189. See supra note 188.
190. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION-PENNSYLVANIA 31
(1982).
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for parens patriae standing under the community-wide harm anal-
ysis. But if all the residents of Millvale (population 5000) 19 1 were
to allege the same violations, parens patriae standing would be
denied, since they represent less than one percent of Penn-
sylvania's total population. 192 The state of Pennsylvania should
have the same duty to protect the voting rights of Millvale resi-
dents as it does to the residents of Philadelphia. This duty is owed
to its citizens as a sovereign duty, and the state may properly em-
ploy parens patriae standing to enforce that duty. The general
nature of the interest at stake, not strictly the number of citizens
affected, invokes the quasi-sovereign interests of the state. 1
93
In summary, the Porter court properly granted parens patriae
standing. The strongest argument for allowing such standing is
the existence of legislation authorizing the attorney general to
sue.1 94 In the absence of legislation, parens patriae suits under
section 1983 become more problematic. 95 While the nonavaila-
bility of private relief and the existence of community-wide harm
are indicators of whether parens patriae suits are appropriate, the
presence of these factors is not an absolute prerequisite to state
standing in section 1983 actions.1 96 The crucial requirement is that
the state be seeking to enforce a duty owed its citizens.
191. Snapp, 659 F.2d at 331.
192. See Note, supra note 129, at 677:
mhe policy of looking to the number of persons directly affected in determining
the jurisdictional question is open to criticism. Analytically... the injury to a
state cannot be realistically separated from the injury to its citizens. Whether
jurisdiction will be taken in proprietary cases depends upon the extent of harm
suffered by the state--in effect, the harm to the state's citizens generally, and not
upon whether the specified individuals might also have been directly affected.
For this reason the parenspatriae question should turn on the extent of harm
experienced by the entire state rather than the number of persons that appear to
be directly affected.
193. See supra note 188.
194. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. The attorney general's authorization
was repealed by the Commonwealth Attorney's Act of October 15, 1980, 71 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 732-503 (Purdon Supp. 1983), which reorganized the attorney general's office
as an independent department of the state, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 732-201 to -206
(Purdon Supp. 1983). The Third Circuit did not consider whether the repeal affected the
attorney general's power to bring the action in Porter, perhaps because the suit predated
passage of the Commonwealth Attorney's Act.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. Common law and longstanding state
policies may, however, create legitimate expectations justifying parens patriae standing.
See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
196. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607-08.
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IV. USING PARENS PATRIAE TO RESOLVE FEDERALISM
CONCERNS
While state use of parens patriae in section 1983 suits may
contradict the statute's original purpose, 197 its usefulness in resolv-
ing the federalism concerns of Rizzo makes such an action worth
considering. Before exploring the benefits of parens patriae stand-
ing, however, it is necessary to identify the problems created by
Rizzo.
One commentator, arguing that federalism principles have no
bearing on suits to vindicate individual rights, has drawn the fol-
lowing distinction:
The essence of the individual rights claim is that no organ of
government, national or state, may undertake the challenged
activity. In contrast, an alleged constitutional violation of the
federalism principle concedes that one of the two levels of gov-
ernment has power to engage in the questioned conduct; the
issue is simply whether the particular level that has acted is the
constitutionally proper one.-
Addressing federalism issues in suits to vindicate individual rights
creates two problems. First, it forces courts to resolve the issue of
which level of government may wield power before reaching the
issue of whether any government may wield such power. 199 Sec-
ond, the issue of federal-state relations, an essentially political is-
sue, is decided in a dispute solely between private individuals and
local officials.Y°° Both problems can be resolved by granting
parens patriae standing in section 1983 suits.
The first problem-confronting a threshold federalism ques-
tion before reaching the substantive issue of individual
rights-does not arise when the state itself seeks the protection of
a federal statute. By suing in federal court, the state is asserting
that its interest is compatible with the exercise of federal power.
The state as plaintiff neatly resolves the federalism issue by ceding
to the federal government the power to afford relief. This frees the
197. Section 1983 was originally enacted as a private remedy aimed at curbing state
civil rights violations; that a state might seek relief as a plaintiff under the statute would
have been unimaginable to the Congress of 1871. See supra notes 23-27 and accompany-
ing text.
198. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vi-, - Vis the States.: The Dispensability of
JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1555 (1977).
199. Id. at 1559-60.
200. Cf. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 22 (1941) (in such
disputes, states' rights claims ironically stem from "a vested ... interest in federal impo-
tency rather than a postive privilege of the states themselves.").
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court to reach the underlying issue of whether a substantive right
has been breached.
Parens patriae standing will also resolve the second prob-
lem-the bestowal of a federalism defense upon nonsovereign liti-
gants such as municipal corporations and their officials. When the
state as sovereign invokes the federal government's power, its
political subdivisions cannot complain of federal intervention,
since they lack the attributes of sovereignty.201 Thus, parens pa-
triae standing facilitates resolution of the real issue in a section
1983 suit-whether a federally protected right has been infringed.
Nevertheless, dangers lurk in permitting parens patriae stand-
ing in section 1983 suits. First, there is the risk that civil rights
enforcement will be subordinated to political expediency. State
suits against municipal defendants, for example, could create an
unduly adversarial relationship; to preserve political harmony,
state executives might forego vigorous prosecution of section 1983
claims. Second, parens patriae suits offer no remedy for civil
rights violations by the state as sovereign. In such cases, federal-
ism concerns are properly implicated, and will continue to thwart
individual causes of action.
20 2
Thus, parens patriae standing is not a panacea. Its only func-
tion is to allow the underlying issues-the nature and extent of the
rights protected by section 1983-to be litigated free from the
complications of federalism.
The benefit of granting parens patriae standing in section 1983
suits is elimination of the federalism barrier through enhanced
state involvement in fashioning remedies. One legitimate concern
of those who invoke federalism principles as a limitation on sec-
tion 1983 is federal encroachment on local government decision-
making.2 3 As plaintiff, the state stands in a position to suggest
appropriate types of relief to the courts and to supervise imple-
mentation of court orders.2°4
This role would permit the state to protect its position in the
201. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) ("Political subdivisions of
States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have been considered as sover-
eign entities."); accord, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
50-51 (1982).
202. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976); supra notes 106-10 and accom-
panying text.
203. This concern motivated National League of Cities. See 426 U.S. at 855.
204. Durchslag, supra note 103, at 761.
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federal system.2"5 Claims of federal encroachment would lose
their force once the state is permitted to protect its political pre-
rogatives by acting as advisor to the courts. This active state par-
ticipation would lend legitimacy to federal court orders.2 °6
V. CONCLUSION
Although Congress enacted what is now section 1983 to pro-
vide federal civil rights enforcement in the wake of state ne-
glect,20 7 early Supreme Court decisions severely restricted its
availability. 0 8 In the 1940's, the Court modified its view of the
fourteenth amendment as a threat to state autonomy as the Court
shifted its priorities from "dual federalism" to the protection of
individual liberties. 9 In Monroe, the Court extended its revised
fourteenth amendment analysis to section 1983 suits, facilitating
access to federal court for civil rights claimants.2"0
Ten years later, with federal dockets growing ever more
crowded, the Court retreated from Monroe and resurrected the
"dual federalism" principle.211 Indicating that certain areas of
state activity are beyond the reach of federal intervention, the
Court in Rizzo warned the lower federal courts against entering
local controversies except in the most extreme circumstances.21 2
The unfortunate effect of the decision, whether or not intended, is
to deny federal relief for most civil rights violations.2 t3
This Note suggests that the federalism concerns which bar sec-
tion 1983 relief may be accommodated by allowing state civil
rights enforcement through parens patriae standing.1 4 While such
standing may contradict the statute's original purpose,215 it fur-
thers the purposes of section 1983 without compromising state au-
tonomy. By invoking its role as parens patriae, the state acts to
205. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607-08 ("[The State has an interest in securing observance
of the terms under which it participates in the federal system.").
206. By providing another avenue for state control over municipalities and local offi-
cials, parens patriae standing might also enlarge the states' power to check local civil rights
abuses. In addition to legislative supervision by restricting local budgets and seeking state
court injunctions, states would be able to enforce § 1983 in federal court.
207. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 197-201 & 203-05 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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fulfill its citizens' legitimate expectations of government protec-
tion216 while pursuing its own interest in checking local abuses of
power. 217 Though not without its drawbacks, 218 parens patriae
standing in section 1983 suits will reconcile the divergent interests
of the states, individual citizens, and the federal government. It
will provide individual civil rights protection while preserving
state autonomy, and lend legitimacy to federal intervention.219
JEFFREY BADDELEY
216. See supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 206.
218. See supra notes 199-200 & 202 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
